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Monday, June 11, 2012
Battle Of Assal Uttar
INDIAN XI CORPS AND BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR
(1965)
Major-General Rajendra Nath, PVSM (Retd.)
BACKGROUND
In conformity with the Government's decision in 1965
that Pakistan’s aggression against Jammu and Kashmir
would be treated as an invasion of India, Army Headquarters
had decided to launch a limited offensive in Punjab, by XI
Corps in Lahore Sector and by I Corps in Sialkot Sector.
General Harbaksh Singh as Army Commander, Western
Command, had felt that our offensive should have the dual
aim of inflicting attrition on sizable forces of Pakistan’s
army along with the acquisition of a large chunk of
Pakistan’s territory which would give our country a
bargaining lever after the war was over. It was a sensible aim
keeping in view the fact that with Pakistan having an edge
over us in armour and artillery, it was not logical to aim at
destruction of Pakistani forces, which is of course, the ideal
in any war to aim at. In XI Corps sector, the plans initially
were purely defensive.
However, during the period of Kutch confrontation in
April-May, 1965, information regarding Ichhogil canal was
obtained. During this period we had deployed our forces in
Amritsar-Lahore Sector, while Pakistan had also deployed
their forces on their side of the border. A close study of
Pakistani deployment during the period indicated that
Pakistan’s forces were likely to remain on the defensive,
basing their defences along Ichhogil canal with very little
forces deployed ahead. In a series of war games held in June
in 1965, it was felt that it should be possible for XI Corps to
advance upto Ichhogil canal and secure the east bank. The
Corps was therefore, ordered to plan for such an offensive
while at the same time ensuring that balance was retained at
all times to counter the likelihood of a major Pakistani
offensive in the corps sector which was expected to be
launched in Khem Karan area. It was a thoughtful
appreciation on our part, as an offensive from Khem Karan
would if successful, pose a threat to our rear from the left
flank and seriously threaten our forces deployed in Amritsar
Sector.
Keeping in view the alignments of various canals and
drains, an offensive by Pakistan in Khem Karan sector would
conform to the grain of the country and would thus facilitate
their operations. Since there would be no requirement to
bridge any canal enroute, no time would be wasted on any
engineering effort. Earlier, our appreciation was that
Pakistan may launch its main offensive along G.T. Road,
Lahore--Amritsar, but General Harbaksh shifted the bias from G.T. road axis to Kasur -Khem Karan -Khalra axis.
General JS Dhillon, Commander XI Corps was also of the
same opinion and so our detailed planning and preparation
for the projected offensive were carried out keeping these
broad based conceptions in view. When situation in the
Chhamb sector became very serious, XI Corps was given
order to launch its offensive which had a limited aim only,
but then Pakistan could not possibly guess it.
In order to capture some of Pakistan’s territory and
in the process also inflict attrition on the Pakistani forces,
XI Corps was instructed to carry out limited offensive
operations in Punjab. It was to advance upto Ichhogil Canal
only, using 15 Division on Amritsar – Lahore axis, 7
Infantry Division was to advance on Khalra-Barki axis
while 4 Mountain Division, comprising two brigades and a
regiment of armour was to secure area upto Ichhogil canal
along Asal Uttar-Khem Karan – Kasur axis, as indicated on
the sketch attached as Annexure-A. 4 Mountain Division
was to destroy the Bridge on Ichhogil Canal on the Khem
Karan – Kasur axis. Later it was to occupy a defended
sector to contain possible Pakistani offensive consisting of
one armoured division and two infantry brigades. For this,
support of an armoured brigade was to be given on priority
basis. However, no additional troops were to be given to
occupy a defended sector or even to establish a firm base
for future operations. Keeping in view the tasks given to 4
Mountain Division, the allocation of troops was indeed
inadequate.
The Indian military leadership had correctly
appreciated that Pakistan was likely to launch its main
offensive in Punjab on Kasur – Khem Karan axis. If
successful, Pakistani forces could advance upto Beas
Bridge and cut-off the Indian forces in Amritsar – Lahore
area. The Indian appreciation that Pakistan’s offensive
forces would consist of an armoured division with at least
two infantry brigades was found correct subsequently. It
would have been therefore appropriate that the Indian
armoured brigade should have been located in 4 Mountain
Division’s operational area to start with, as Pakistan was
expected to launch its main offensive in this area. But for
reasons not clear, it was not done. It was instead located in
15 Divisional sector.
PAKISTAN’S PLANS
Pakistan had planned to remain on the defensive in
Lahore sector except for Khem Karan where it wanted to
launch the biggest offensive of 1965 war, using 1
Armoured Division and two Infantry brigades. The
offensive plan was obviously prepared well in advance, for
Pakistan selected its axis of attack with great care. Pakistan
had located l Armoured Division near Kasur primarily for this purpose. Their security measures were obviously good,
for nobody on our side was aware of its location. If our
military commanders had any inkling of probable location
of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division, they would have either
altered 4 Mountain Division’s attack plans or provided it
with an extra brigade to have a proper firm base on the
ground, on which the division could build up a coordinated
defence, to deal with the Pakistani offensive.
Pakistan started its offensive in Khem Karan sector
only after our operations in both 4 and 15 Division sectors
had come to a halt with very minor gains by way of capture
of Pakistani territory. Pakistan had not located any armour
east of Ichhogil canal to start with, but inducted it later,
once XI Corps offensive started. On the whole, XI Corps
offensive had a limited aim of leaning on Ichhogil canal
and in the process to capture some territory. This limited
offensive can also be termed as a defensive measure. On
the other hand, the aim of the Pakistani offensive in Khem
Karan sector was much more ambitious and bold and
entailed trapping of XI Corps west of Beas River. It was
perhaps at the back of XI Corps Commander's mind that by
achieving surprise, his troops would reach the Ichhogil
canal on a very broad front-nearly 45 miles from north to
south and consolidate the positions quickly before Pakistan
could retaliate in any strength. But things are never so
simple in war, as they look while discussing plans on the
sand model. That is why, after initially surprising the
enemy, the Corps was itself surprised by the slow progress
of its operations, and later by Pakistan’s offensive.
It was expected by us that initially Pakistan would
remain on the defensive in this sector, like in other sectors
of XI corps. Pakistan had 11 Division of two brigades and
one armoured regiment opposite 4 Divisional sector. Major
General Abdul Hamid Khan GOC, I1 Division, was an
aggressive commander. He had actually decided to fight
ahead of the canal and carry the battle into the Indian
territory as soon as the opportunity arose. After all,
Pakistan had decided on its most important offensive in this
sector which meant provision of a firm base on the Indian
territory by 11 Division. As we shall see, General Hamid
reacted sharply as soon as 4 Division started its operations.
Unknown to the Indian intelligence, Pakistan’s 1 Armoured
Division was behind Kasur ready for its offensive on axis
Kasur-Khem Karan with deep objectives. It was
commanded by Major General Nasir Ahmed who had
throughout been an Infantry officer. He was given
command of the prestigious formation either because he
was considered a very competent commander or he had
necessary influence in the Pakistani military hierarchy.
Asal Uttar where the major battle took place lies
about 60 kilometres south west of Amritsar and is connected by a road. Another road running north east from
Khem Karan connects it by way of Taran Taran to Harike –
Amritsar highway. Asal Uttar lies five kilometres north east
of Khem Karan. The area is flat and tankable and portions
of it can be flooded due to the canals that run parallel to the
road.
PAKISTAN’S OFFENSIVE AND BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR
By morning of 8th September, 4 Division had hastily
occupied a defended sector at Assal Uttar with three and a
half battalions while the engineers were busy laying mines,
along the main approaches. The Pakistani forces were
getting ready for their master stroke in this sector. The
Pakistan’s plan came to light when operational orders and
other secret documents were later on captured during the
battle. The Pakistanis had made a bold plan which seemed to
be patterned after Rommel's deep thrusts in the North
African Campaign. Rommel after inflicting a tactical defeat
on a British force used to make a wide encircling movement
to cut off other forces in the area. The Pakistanis perhaps
wanted to repeat his performance in Khem Karan sector. The
prime aim of the operation was to break out along axis,
Kasur-Khem Karan and encircle XI Corps, by capturing the
bridges at Harike and Beas. This would enable Pakistan to
encircle and later destroy XI Corps by attacking it from the
rear, as well as from the flanks. This would give Pakistan not
only all the territory west of Beas river but also provide a
free run towards Delhi. We had hardly one armoured unit
between Beas and Ambala at that time. Our only armoured
division was engaged in bitter fighting as part of 1 Corps
offensive in the north, in Phillora-Sialkot area, while the 2
Armoured Brigade was engaged in a battle in the XI Corps
sector. Perhaps Field Marshal Ayub Khan was dreaming of
entering into Delhi exactly as Mussolini had dreamt of
entering Alexandria in North Africa in 1941!
The plan envisaged establishment of a bridge head by
two brigades of 11 Infantry Division with 5 Armoured
Brigade in area Mastgarh-Bhura Kuhna which was very
close to Asal Uttar where 4 Division had already taken up a
defended sector. Then 1 Armoured Division was to break out
as under:
(a) 3 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments
and an infantry battalion in armoured personnel carriers
would advance astride Kasur Branch. It will then capture
Jandiala Guru on the main GT road, connecting Amritsar
with Jullundur, thus cutting off Amritsar from the east.
(b) 4 Armoured Brigade of two regiments and a
motorised infantry battalion would advance along the KasurKhem Karan-Valtoha-Nabipur near Harike bridge axis,
astride the Sabraon Branch Canal, and capture Beas on GT
road. This thrust would cut off XI Corps. from Beas river, as on the way it would have secured Harike bridge over Beas
river while passing through Nabipur area.
(c) 5 Armoured Brigade with one armoured regiment
and an infantry battalion in armoured personnel carriers
would first help11 Division in establishing the bridge head.
It would then advance on the Khem Karan-Bhikhiwind axis
to protect the left flank of the first two combat groups and
also to isolate 7 Infantry Division, so that it could not send
any troops to help 4 Division in it's battle or interfere with
Pakistan’s offensive. According to the Plan, the attackers
were to reach Harike Bridge by 8 September and at Beas
Bridge by the evening of 9 September. It proposed to exploit
the terrain in this sector where the canals and nalas run in the
general direction of north east to south west. The thrust lines
were matched to the grain of the country. It was an
audacious plan. Only 4 Mountain Division or its routed
remnants as Pakistanis wrongly believed stood in the way.
By morning of 8 September, 4 Division consisting of
three and a half battalions had taken up a defended sector in
Asal Uttar which mainly consisted of 62 Infantry Brigade
troops. The Deccan Horse less one squadron had taken up
positions in this defended sector in the anti-tank role to deal
with Pakistani tank assaults. The third squadron was
protecting the gun areas immediately behind this defended
sector where one field regiment (25 Pounders), one medium
regiment (5.5 inch guns), one light regiment (120mm
mortars) and two mountain composite regiments (3.7 inch
howitzers) had been deployed. The Divisional Headquarters
was located behind the gun area, well away from the battle
area for the reasons which are not clear. It should preferably
have been located inside the defended sector. 3 Cavalry was
deployed behind, covering the area Chima-Dibbipura while 8
Cavalry, the second regiment of the Independent Armoured
Brigade, was deployed on the flanks. In all we had three
regiments of armour, one had Centurions, the second had
Shermans and the third had AMX-13 light tanks, to deal with
the Pakistani armoured division with an additional regiment
of tanks belonging to 11 Division, six regiments of tanks in
all. Meanwhile, 4 Mountain Division had taken a useful step
by breaching Rohi nalah and the distributory canals to flood
the area to the south and south west of the Divisional
defended sector. It curtailed the mobility of Pakistan’s
armour.
THE CRUCIAL BATTLE
On 8th September, enemy carried out what appeared to
be probing cum-reconnaissance mission in strength. A
combat group of two squadrons of Chaffee (light) tanks with
squadron of Pattons and some motorised infantry made a
bold infiltration attempt from the northern flank to attack the
gun area, where a squadron of Deccan Horse was waiting for them in a well concealed position. In a fierce tank battle,
Pakistan lost 11 tanks while we lost four tanks. The Pakistani
combat group withdrew in haste. As yet, the Pakistani
commanders were not really aware of 4 Divisional defended
sector in Asal Uttar area. Later in the evening, another
armour cum infantry group consisting of a Patton
regiment, a squadron of Chaffees of Pakistan’s 5
Armoured Brigade assaulted 4 Division defended sector
after a heavy artillery bombardment. It succeeded in over
running a portion of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles’ defended area. It
later attacked 4 Grenadiers defended area from the
northern flank which lay behind the 1/9 Gorkhas’
defended area. During this move, it was fired upon by
one squadron of 3 Cavalry which had taken position in
the Bhikiwind area. The enemy was obviously enlarging
its bridge head in Bhura Kuhna-Mastgarh area, for its
armoured division to break out. Meanwhile, heavy
fighting took place in 4 Grenadiers area where Pakistani
tanks managed to over run some positions, in spite of
effective fire of the battalion's 106mm anti tank
recoilless guns. The anti-tank recoilless guns of other
units particularly those of 18 Rajputana Rifles did a lot
of useful firing and a few Pakistani tanks were destroyed
and some others were damaged. The battle continued till
last light when there was some respite.
The way Pakistan was using its armour to assault our
defended areas came as a great surprise to us, for we had
never used our armour in peace time exercises or in war
in such a bold and audacious manner. The Pakistani
method of attack on our defended areas needs to be
described in some detail. A typical tank assault would
commence with the approach of light tanks boosted by
Shermans or Patton tanks. They would feel for the gaps
in our defended areas and probe our flanks to find out the
extent of our defences while their artillery would keep
our suspected positions engaged so that our anti-tank
guns were not very effective. After this reconnaissance,
some of their tanks would move to a flank partly to lure
our tanks and partly to divert our artillery fire. Then
Pakistan’s armour would assault our positions followed
by their infantry in armoured personnel carriers. The
tanks would assault with six to eight abreast firing their
secondary and main armament and would be followed by
the Infantry who would dismount from their armoured
personnel carriers and attack our positions. All this time,
their artillery would be neutralising our positions.
Another method of assault was that Pakistan’s assaulting
tanks, normally six to eight abreast well spread out,
would charge our positions firing their guns but stop
short of our positions, just outside the range of our antitank guns. Meanwhile, other follow up tanks would come up and try to envelop the defences and over run them from
right or left flank. Their aim was generally to frighten our
infantry and over run our positions.
A combination of above tactics had been tried by
Pakistani forces against both 62 and 7 Brigade units who
had gone on offensive on 6th September and captured
Pakistan’s forward positions. Before these units could dig
in, the Pakistan had used their armour and infantry boldly
in assault which had unnerved some of our troops, for we
had not taught or practised such tactics in our army till
1965. However, our troops had discovered that Pakistan’s
armour assaults would fizzle out whenever our infantry
stood its ground using its anti-tank guns and was supported
by our artillery. The units of 4 Division were now getting
accustomed to Pakistan’s pattern of armour and infantry
assaults and so were giving a good account of themselves.
The day long Pakistani armour assaults along with
infantry had hardly any worthwhile success while quite a
few of their tanks had been destroyed or damaged. The
Pakistani commanders persisted in using the same tactics at
night. If they had made full use of two brigades of I 1
Division to attack one or two of our battalion defended
areas at night after proper reconnaissance, they would have
achieved much better results. But flushed with their initial
success against 62 and 7 Brigades on 6 and 7 September,
they had decided to use the same tactics on 8 September.
After midnight on 8 September, the Pakistani tank noises
were heard and by 2 a.m. on 9 September, their 4 Armoured
Brigade with two regiments of Patton tanks and a motorised
battalion were attacking 18 Rajputana Rifles defended area
making use of the moon light. The Pakistani Patton tanks
were making full use of their infra-red equipment during
their night assaults. Brigadier H.C. Gahlaut, Commander 62
Infantry Brigade was a capable and skilful commander and
had instructed 18 Rajputana Rifles to hold fast even if some
of its positions were over-run. The Pakistani tanks had to
pass through mines and endure concentrated fire of five of
our artillery regiments, which were firing on the unit’s
frontage. This fire was supplemented by unit mortars and
anti-tank guns. The Pakistani tank assault therefore did not
succeed.
18 Rajputana Rifles under brave leadership of their
officers had held on to their positions in spite of heavy fire
of Pakistan’s tanks as well as their divisional artillery
which was giving all out support. In a battle, it is the
spirit which men bring to the fight that decides the issue.
18 Rajputana Rifles, 4 Grenadiers, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, 9 J
& K Rifles less two companies were displaying that spirit
in plenty and consequently all Pakistani assaults were
being defeated. In all Pakistan had made five assaults
during the night. At the same time, Pakistan must be given due credit for audacious use of such large number
of tanks for a night assault on a battalion defended area
which had mines on all important approaches. Though
the unit had held on to its positions, it was obvious to
Brigadier Gahlaut and General Gurbaksh Singh, the
Indian GOC that the Pakistani troops would assault again
in the day time making use of their tanks. It is well said
that adversity reveals the true qualities of a leader.
General Gurbaksh Singh, whose division had not only
failed to achieve any of its objectives during its offensive
but had fallen back in a disorderly manner, was now
fighting very well. The leadership of General Gurbaksh
Singh and Brigadier Gahlaut was having its effect on the
units who were now ready to defeat the Pakistani
designs. Gurbaksh had warned the division for the big
battle that lay ahead and his men were ready for the
challenge.
He had ordered 2 (Indep) Armoured Brigade to deal
with the Pakistani tanks which would try to bypass the
defended Sector by making out-flanking movements
while Deccan Horse was to help the defended sector in
repulsing Pakistani assaults, particularly those led by the
tanks. Brigadier Theogaraj was a competent commander
with a keen eye for the ground and had deployed 3
Cavalry in a skilful manner so as to destroy the
maximum number of enemy tanks. 3 Cavalry was
deployed in two semi circles in a wide horse shoe
pattern. The mouths of these semi circles opened towards
the west and so the Indian tanks waited with both the
jaws wide open to devour the Pakistani tanks. Many
tanks had been cleverly sited behind the standing tall
crops of sugarcane so that the Pakistani tanks could not
see them till it was too late. The light regiment of the
brigade was deployed on the flanks of 3 Cavalry, to lure
Pakistani tanks on to the killing ground. This skilful
sitting of the two regiments along with high standard of
marksmanship of our tank gunners and gallant infantry
battalions were responsible for mauling 1 Armoured
Division, which was Pakistan’s elite formation.
However, Headquarters. XI Corps did not take any
other effective measure to reinforce Khem Karan sector
except to place 2 Independent Armoured Brigade under the
command of 4 Division. Yet XI Corps had deployed four
Infantry brigades and two regiments of armour in 15
Divisional sector to safeguard that sector while there were
only three and a half battalions and two medium armoured
regiments and one light regiment to fight in Khem Karan
where main Pakistan’s offensive was expected to come,
according to its own appreciation. This shows that XI Corps
commander was over cautious in his assessment as regards
15 Divisional sector while he was comparatively speakingneglecting Khem Karan sector where the enemy’s main
offensive was expected. The Indian military leaders at
times display an over-cautious attitude during war which
needs to be corrected. It is strange that Headquarters
Western Command did not react either. Luckily, the brave
infantry battalions of 4 Division supported well by our
efficient artillery and the well led armour rose to the
occasion and dealt the prestigious armoured division of
Pakistan a blow which was perhaps the highlight of 1965
war.
On 9 September, Pakistan made use of its air force to soften
up defended sector both in the morning as well as in the
afternoon along with heavy artillery fire. The Pakistani
troops attacked with armour, 4 Grenadiers positions which
fought back under the spirited command of Lieutenant
Colonel (later Major General) Farhat Bhatti and repulsed
the attack. In the afternoon, Pakistani armour and infantry
fiercely attacked 18 Rajputana Rifles position after heavy
artillery fire. The unit fought bravely and repulsed the
attack with effective support of our artillery and the tanks
of Deccan Horse. In these attacks, Pakistan lost quite a few
tanks as they persisted in assaulting and at one place
managed to over run some defences of 18 Rajputana Rifles.
But the unit held on to its positions. The enemy broke off
the attack finally at 10 p.m. at night when the area
around the Rajputana Rifles’ forward defended localities
was littered with burning Pakistani tanks. Colonel Raghubir
Singh of the unit was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his
inspiring leadership in which his men and officers had
fought so gallantly. The Pakistani commanders had
persisted in attacking the Divisional defended sector with
tanks and infantry but had achieved no success at all. So it
was expected that after having failed to over run the
Divisional defended sector, Pakistan would now make a
final effort to break out by making outflanking thrusts on
10 September. 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade was
precisely deployed to deal with such thrusts.
On 10th September, the Pakistani armour and
infantry attacked 4 Grenadiers from the north which was
repulsed after a fierce battle in which Havildar Abdul
Hamid knocked out two Patton tanks and damaged one
more, as the Pakistani tanks charged his defended
locality and destroyed his gun and its detachment. The
gallantry of this brave soldier was recognised by a
posthumous award of the Param Vir Chakra. By mid day,
the combat group which was attacking 4 Grenadiers from
the north was also trying to make a northern outflanking
movement. Here a squadron of 3 Cavalry was waiting for
the kill in a sugarcane field. As the Pakistani tanks
appeared, they were hit by well camouflaged and hidden
tanks which took the Pakistani combat group by complete surprise. The tanks of Deccan Horse also fired on
Pakistan’s tanks from the flank as they were heading
east. The Pakistani combat group was caught in crossfire.
After losing many tanks, the combat group turned back to
lick its wounds.
Foiled in the northern hook, the Divisional
Commander tried a wider southern out-flanking move
towards Dibbipura-Mahmudpura area. Pakistan sent 4
Armoured Brigade with 4 Cavalry in the lead with
motorised infantry battalion following behind. The
Centurion tanks of 3 Cavalry were waiting for this
southerly hook behind the cover of high crops. The
Shermans of 9 Horse were also able to bring down fire
from the northern side on this tank column. This
southerly outflanking movement had been visualised by
us earlier and some areas had been flooded 24 hours
earlier which was of course not known to the Pakistanis.
The Pakistanis were moving into the mouth of the semi
circle where our tanks could fire from three directions. It
was an ideal trap. Our divisional artillery was ready to
bring down maximum concentration in this area too. As
the Pakistani Patton tanks moved into the trap, they were
fired upon from cleverly sited hull down positions of our
tanks. A better part of 4 Cavalry regiment was shot to
pieces by our tanks aided by effective artillery fire.
Many Pakistani tanks had got bogged down in the
flooded terrain and became easy targets for our tanks. Now
the Pakistan southerly out-flanking move had been blunted
the same way, as was their northern hook a few hours earlier.
Major General Nasir, Commander of the Pakistani Armoured
Division, had been watching the battle from his helicopter
and was very disappointed, as the outflanking moves had
failed. It was a critical situation that his division was
facing. He came down and moved forward with his
reconnaissance group to mile-stone 37 on Khem KaranBhikhiwind road to push forward his armour by a last ditch
personal effort. The following conversation between the
Divisional Commander and his armoured brigade
Commander illustrates the true conditions of the battle:
"Brigade Commander to Divisional Commander:
It is not possible to advance due to stiff resistance.
Heavy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down."
"Divisional Commander to Brigade Commander:
It is most important that the advance continues.
Therefore, in the name of Islam, Pakistan and the Hilal-e-
Jurat, I command you to get up and go forward.”
"Brigade Commander to Divisional Commander:
“I will do my best but as things are how the hell I
am going to do that? The bloody enemy artillery is
knocking the hell out of us and I am afraid I cannot do
any better than this." Major General Nasir then moved forward and talked
to the commanding officer of 4 Cavalry impressing upon
him the dire necessity of advancing regardless of
casualties. At 6 p.m. General Nasir and his
reconnaissance group came under our heavy artillery fire
in which Brigadier Shammi, the artillery commander of
the Pakistani armoured division was killed, General Nasir
was wounded along with a few other personnel. That was
the end of Pakistan’s offensive. In the battle lasting 8 to
10 September, the pride of Pakistan’s army, their
armoured division was humbled by the combined efforts
of our infantry, gunners as well as armour. The battlefield presented the picture of a grave yard of tanks.
Pakistan lost 97 tanks including 72 Pattons, though a
fairly large number must have been damaged also. Our
losses were 10 tanks of Deccan Horse and only two
tanks of 3 Cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel AS Vaidya, the
gallant Commander of Deccan Horse which gave such
excellent support to Divisional defended sector was
decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra and so were
Brigadier Theogaraj and Lieutenant Colonel Salim
Calib, Commanding Officer of 3 Cavalry.
The Pakistan’s plan of the offensive was bold but its
execution was poor. The Pakistani Commanders should
have used two brigades of 11 Division to deal with our
defended sector which was mainly 62 Infantry Brigade
sector and used its powerful armoured division in an
outflanking move and spend its force in defeating Indian
tank regiments. We had only one Centurion regiment
which was equivalent to the Patton tank while the other
one had only Shermans, a much inferior tank to the
Patton while the third regiment was a light regiment of
AMX-13 tanks which was no match to the Pattons. The
Pakistan had five Patton regiments and one Chaffee
regiment, an overwhelming superiority over our tanks.
But they wasted most of their efforts in assaulting the
defended sector in which they sustained unnecessary
losses and wasted time. There is no substitute for
superior military leadership which was the main reason
for complete failure of Pakistan’s offensive plan.
4 Mountain Division had met with initial reverses in
the Khem Karan Sector, but the division under General
Gurbaksh Singh and Brigadier Gahlaut had not only
retrieved its honour on the battle-field of Asal Uttar but
had defeated a concerted and well planned effort of the
Pakistan Army to launch a Blitzkrieg type of offensive
which if successful could have had dangerous consequences for us. So General Gurbaksh Singh was
awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, and Brigadier Gahlaut
was given the AVSM. The Pakistanis on their part were
greatly worried by our I Corps offensive in the Sialkot-Shakargarh sector and after the battle of Asal Uttar;
they left behind 5 Armoured Brigade in support of their
11 Division and moved the rest of their armoured
division to that area to deal with the Indian offensive.
Their interior lines of communications were of great
help to them.
At the end of war, about 100 Pakistan destroyed
or damaged tanks were collected at a place which was
named ‘Patton Nagar’ (near Bhikhiwind) where foreign
military attaches were invited to visit the battle as well as
see the Pakistani tanks at ‘Patton Nagar’. The German
military attaché remarked that the Pakistan’s plan was
bold and sound but perhaps only the German Army could
carry it out!
It is interesting to note that this crucial offensive
of Pakistan’s Army was not fully supported by its Air
Force. If Pakistan had used its Air Force in strength to
give close support to its offensive, it could have achieved
much better results. On the Indian side, our Air Force
also gave only limited support to 4 Infantry Division in
this important battle. So Pakistan and India had both
failed to make use of their Air Force to give proper
support to their fighting forces. Both India and Pakistan
had learnt nothing from Second World War where the Air
Force was used extensively to help the land forces. Land
Battle is an integrated affair which concerns both Army
as well as Air Force, which needs to be understood by the
Indian Armed Forces.
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
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